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INTRODUCTION 
onsider a scenario in which a suspect is arrested and is interviewed 
by police officers who fail to give him his Miranda warnings.1 
Charges are subsequently filed, and the interview is introduced against 
the suspect in a preliminary hearing. The court then binds the case over 
for trial based largely on incriminatory information in the suspect’s 
interview. However, the case is eventually dismissed before a trial can 
take place. The suspect subsequently files suit against the police 
officers, arguing that they violated his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination and that he is entitled to damages for the time he 
spent incarcerated for the charge that was dismissed. 
Is the suspect (now plaintiff) correct that his right against self-
incrimination was violated? Would this right have been violated if 
charges had never been filed? Would it have made a difference if the 
interview had been introduced in a jury trial? 
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has failed to 
provide clear answers to these questions. Specifically, the Court has 
failed to give a clear indication about exactly when the right against 
self-incrimination comes into play. The Court had an opportunity to do 
so in Chavez v. Martinez,2 but it did not. This has led to a split between 
the circuit courts, with some circuits holding that the right against self-
incrimination applies only to trials, while other circuits hold that the 
right applies to stages of criminal proceedings that occur before trial. 
The resulting system of rules that depends on the location of the court 
is a significant problem that the Supreme Court should fix. 
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part I contains background 
information on the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause. Part 
II examines the Supreme Court’s failure in Chavez to resolve the 
question of exactly when the right against self-incrimination comes into 
play. Part III surveys the split of authority among the federal circuit 
courts as a result of Chavez. Finally, Part IV suggests that the Court 
should clearly indicate that the right against self-incrimination is not 
violated unless compelled statements are introduced at trial. 
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that appropriate procedural 
safeguards are to be used to protect a suspect’s right against self-incrimination and to inform 
the suspect of the right to counsel). 
2 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
C 
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I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The right against self-incrimination has been fundamental to 
societies, even before the American court system adopted it. The 
earliest form of the privilege against self-incrimination appears to come 
from the ancient scriptures from Old Testament times.3 Under the 
Talmud, which reflected ancient teachings about the law of Moses, 
“an accused had an absolute (and unwaivable) ‘right’ against self-
incrimination.”4 In addition, there was no distinction between 
voluntary and compelled confessions because “[n]o statement from the 
mouth of the accused could be used against him criminally.”5 
The privilege against self-incrimination took form in England during 
the late middle ages.6 It was originally developed as a “defense against 
a variety of oaths requiring witnesses and defendants to swear to 
truthfully answer potentially incriminating questions.”7 The privilege 
gained more traction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when it 
began to be used by Catholic and Puritan dissidents against oaths used 
by the Star Chamber and High Commission, which required defendants 
to respond truthfully to questions before they even knew the charges 
against them.8 English judges of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries continued developing the privilege.9 
The privilege against self-incrimination did not make an initially 
smooth transition across the Atlantic to the American Colonies. 
Indeed, it is “difficult to generalize about the reception of the privilege 
because of the vast diversity among the colonies.”10 There are 
examples during the early colonial period in which the privilege was 
honored and examples of when it was not, but the privilege gained 
3 Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness 
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 67 n.22 (1989). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. “According to Maimonides, who codified the rule in the twelfth century, the 
principle that an accused could not be convicted upon his own admission was a ‘divine 
decree.’” Id. (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 433–41 
(1968)). 
6 Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 309, 315 (1998). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 315–16.  
9 Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The 
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v. 
Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1001 (2003). 
10 Benner, supra note 3, at 84. 
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general acceptance as the colonies matured.11 In fact, “[t]he state 
declarations of rights adopted prior to the federal Bill of Rights 
routinely included a protection against self-incrimination.”12 
Against this backdrop the Founding Fathers created the Fifth 
Amendment. In its final form, the Fifth Amendment states in pertinent 
part that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself.”13 The meaning of “criminal case” is not 
intuitively obvious, and this has led to differing opinions over the years. 
A. Missed Opportunities by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court touched on the meaning of “criminal case” a 
number of times before the Court really delved into the issue in Chavez, 
but not in a definitive way. For instance, the Court addressed the 
privilege against self-incrimination in the grand jury context in the 
1892 case of Counselman v. Hitchcock.14 In that case, the Court 
rejected the contention that a person could invoke the privilege only in 
a criminal case against himself.15 In holding that Counselman could 
not be held in contempt for invoking his privilege in front of the grand 
jury, the Court stated: “If Counselman had been guilty of the matters 
inquired of in the questions which he refused to answer, he himself was 
liable to criminal prosecution under the act. The case before the grand 
jury was, therefore, a criminal case.”16  
The Supreme Court again dealt with the question of whether 
someone could be held in contempt for invoking the privilege against 
self-incrimination in a grand jury proceeding in Kastigar v. United 
States.17 In addressing the question, the Court stated that the privilege 
“can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or 
judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any 
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a 
11 Id. at 85. 
12 Davies, supra note 9, at 998 & n.62 (“Twelve of the initial fourteen states (counting 
Vermont) adopted a state constitution prior to the adoption of the federal Bill of 
Rights (Connecticut and Rhode Island continued to operate under their colonial charters); 
eight of the twelve adopted a declaration of rights as part of their state constitutions, and 
each of those declarations contained a provision constitutionalizing the right against self-
accusation.”). 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
14 142 U.S. 547 (1892), overruled in part by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 
(1972). 
15 Id. at 562. 
16 Id. 
17 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
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criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so 
used.”18 However, the Court held that testimony can be compelled 
under a grant of immunity from the prosecution.19 
The Supreme Court subsequently addressed the question of whether 
a probationer can invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in 
Minnesota v. Murphy.20 The Court answered the question in the 
affirmative, stating, 
A defendant does not lose this protection by reason of his conviction 
of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant is imprisoned or on 
probation at the time he makes incriminating statements, if those 
statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent trial 
for a crime other than that for which he has been convicted.21 
In addition, the Court stated, 
It has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person 
to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a 
defendant, but also “privileges him not to answer official questions 
put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or 
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 
proceedings.”22  
Thus, the question for the Court was whether the privilege was 
“violated by the admission into evidence at his trial for another crime 
of the prior statements made by him to his probation officer.”23 
The question of whether a sentencing hearing was part of a “criminal 
case” was addressed by the Court in Mitchell v. United States.24 The 
Court began by stating that a guilty plea does not extinguish the 
privilege against self-incrimination.25 The Court explained that “[i]t is 
true, as a general rule, that where there can be no further incrimination, 
there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege,” but “[w]here the 
sentence has not yet been imposed a defendant may have a legitimate 
fear of adverse consequences from further testimony.”26 Significantly, 
the Court held “[t]he Fifth Amendment by its terms prevents a person 
from being ‘compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
18 Id. at 444–45. 
19 Id. at 448. 
20 465 U.S. 420 (1984). 
21 Id. at 426. 
22 Id. (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). 
23 Id. 
24 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 
25 Id. at 324. 
26 Id. at 326. 
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himself.’ To maintain that sentencing proceedings are not part of ‘any 
criminal case’ is contrary to the law and to common sense.”27 
Although these cases addressed what “criminal case” means with 
regard to when someone can invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination, they did not clearly indicate what “criminal case” means 
when it comes to the prosecution introducing previously compelled 
testimony against a criminal defendant. That question remained 
unanswered. 
II 
CHAVEZ V. MARTINEZ 
The Supreme Court finally dealt with the issue of whether the Fifth 
Amendment is violated when the prosecution uses a compelled 
statement before trial in its plurality opinion in Chavez v. Martinez.28 
In that case, Martinez encountered police officers who were 
investigating suspected narcotics activity in a vacant lot.29 The police 
performed a pat down search of Martinez, and they found a knife on 
his person.30 This led to an altercation during which Martinez was shot 
several times, leaving him permanently blind and paralyzed from the 
waist down.31  
When Martinez was taken to a local hospital for emergency medical 
treatment, officer Chavez questioned him for ten minutes total over a 
forty-five-minute period without giving him Miranda warnings.32 
Martinez told Chavez that he would not say anything until he received 
medical attention, but Chavez continued the interrogation.33 During the 
questioning, Martinez admitted that he took a gun from an officer’s 
holster and pointed it at the police, and he admitted that he was a heroin 
user.34  
Martinez survived the ordeal but was never prosecuted, so his 
statements were never used against him in a criminal proceeding.35 
However, he filed a civil suit in federal court, “maintaining that 
Chavez’s actions violated his Fifth Amendment right not to be 
27 Id. at 327 (citation omitted). 
28 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
29 Id. at 763.  
30 Id. at 763–64. 
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‘compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ as 
well as his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be 
free from coercive questioning.”36 The district court granted summary 
judgment against Chavez on his qualified immunity defense.37 Chavez 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that 
“Chavez’s ‘coercive questioning’ of Martinez violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights, ‘[e]ven though Martinez’s statements were not 
used against him in a criminal proceeding.’”38 In a fractured Supreme 
Court opinion, six Justices held that no violation of Martinez’s Fifth 
Amendment right occurred that would support a finding of civil 
liability under § 1983.39 
Justice Thomas authored an opinion announcing the judgment of the 
Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and 
Scalia.40 Thomas began his reasoning by stating, 
The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, requires that “[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” We 
fail to see how, based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Martinez 
can allege a violation of this right, since Martinez was never 
prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness against 
himself in a criminal case.41 
Thomas then addressed the contention that “criminal case” should 
be defined as the entire criminal process, including police 
investigations.42 Thomas rejected that contention and stated that “[i]n 
our view, a ‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the initiation of 
legal proceedings.”43 
Justice Thomas then stated that the Court “need not decide today the 
precise moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences.”44 However, 
“[s]tatements compelled by police interrogations of course may not be 
used against a defendant at trial, but it is not until their use in a criminal 
case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.”45 
Thomas then made the crucial statement that has been the source of the 
36 Id. at 764–65. 
37 Id. at 765. 
38 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
39 Id. at 766–73, 777–79. 
40 Id. at 766–73. 
41 Id. at 766 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 767. 
45 Id. (citations omitted). 
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debate in the circuit courts: “Although conduct by law enforcement 
officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional 
violation occurs only at trial.”46 
For Justice Thomas, there is a distinction between the privilege 
against self-incrimination and the core Fifth Amendment right itself.47 
Specifically, Thomas stated that 
[a]lthough our cases have permitted the Fifth Amendment’s self-
incrimination privilege to be asserted in noncriminal cases, that does
not alter our conclusion that a violation of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to
be a witness against himself in a criminal case.48
Because Martinez was never prosecuted, he was never compelled to be 
a witness against himself.49 That did not mean 
that police torture or other abuse that results in a confession is 
constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are not used at 
trial; it simply mean[t] that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases and 
provide relief in appropriate circumstances.50 
In a separate opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, 
agreed with Thomas that “the text of the Fifth Amendment . . . focuses 
on courtroom use of a criminal defendant’s compelled, self-
incriminating testimony, and the core of the guarantee against 
compelled self-incrimination is the exclusion of any such evidence.”51 
However, Souter believed that the Court’s ruling “requires a degree of 
discretionary judgment greater than Justice Thomas acknowledges.”52 
Ultimately, Souter concluded that Martinez’s claim for monetary 
damages should be rejected because the claim was “well outside the 
core of Fifth Amendment protection” and Martinez did not demonstrate 
the “powerful showing” needed to justify expanding protection of the 
core Fifth Amendment right to include civil liability.53 Although the 
Court in Chavez addressed whether the Fifth Amendment is violated 
when the prosecution uses a compelled statement before trial, the Court 
46 Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)). 
47 See id. at 770–73. 
48 Id. at 770 (citations omitted). 
49 Id. at 767. 
50 Id. at 773 (emphasis added). 
51 Id. at 777. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 777–79. 
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ultimately failed to resolve the question of when a “criminal case” 
begins.  
III 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The Supreme Court’s failure in Chavez to declare when a “criminal 
case” begins has led to a split between the circuit courts on that issue. 
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have held that the 
right against self-incrimination applies only at trial, while the Second, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that certain pretrial uses 
of compelled statements violate the Fifth Amendment. 
A. Self-Incrimination Applies Only at Trial
1. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit addressed the meaning of “criminal case” in
Renda v. King.54 That case began when Renda got into a domestic 
dispute with her boyfriend, took their son, and left the residence.55 The 
boyfriend called the police to report that Renda had abducted their son 
in violation of a custody order.56 This led Trooper King to contact 
Renda by telephone.57 Renda told King that her boyfriend had 
assaulted her, but she did not want to make a statement and wanted to 
be left alone.58  
Despite this request, King conducted an in-person interview of 
Renda the next day, without providing Renda her Miranda warnings.59 
Renda provided a written statement during the interview, but the 
statement did not mention the assault by her boyfriend.60 King 
subsequently claimed that Renda said she did not mention the assault 
in the written statement because she had lied when she said it had 
occurred.61 Renda later claimed that she never said she had lied. She 
instead claimed that she did not mention the assault in the written 
statement because she did not want to file a complaint against her 
54 347 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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boyfriend and that she provided the written statement only because 
King had threatened her.62 
King subsequently filed a charge of giving a false report against 
Renda, and Renda was arrested.63 The trial court suppressed Renda’s 
statements from the in-person interview because she was not given her 
Miranda warnings prior to the custodial interview.64 This led to the 
prosecutor dismissing the case.65 Renda subsequently filed suit against 
King and others under § 1983, alleging, among other things, that King 
had violated her constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting her to a coercive interrogation 
and interrogating her without giving her the Miranda warnings.66 The 
district court subsequently dismissed the claim related to Miranda, and 
Renda appealed.67 
The Third Circuit upheld the dismissal of the Miranda claim based 
on the reasoning of Chavez.68 Specifically, the court held that under 
Chavez, “questioning a plaintiff in custody without providing Miranda 
warnings is not a basis for a § 1983 claim as long as the plaintiff’s 
statements are not used against her at trial.”69 The court did note that 
there was a difference between the facts in Chavez and the instant case 
since no criminal charges were ever filed against Martinez, but 
“Renda’s statement was used in a criminal case in one sense (i.e., to 
develop probable cause sufficient to charge her).”70 However, the 
Third Circuit concluded that this distinction was unimportant because 
“it is the use of coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not in 
obtaining an indictment, that violates the Constitution.”71 Because the 
charges against Renda were dropped before trial, her constitutional 
right against self-incrimination was not violated.72 
62 Id. at 552–53. 





68 Id. at 557–58. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 558–59. 
71 Id. at 559. 
72 Id. 
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2. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit addressed the meaning of “criminal case” in
Burrell v. Virginia.73 The case began when Burrell was involved in a 
traffic accident and refused an officer’s request to produce insurance 
documents by asserting his privilege against self-incrimination.74 The 
officer told Burrell that he would be arrested for obstruction of justice 
if he did not comply.75 Burrell continued to refuse to comply, and he 
was charged with obstruction of justice and was convicted of that 
charge in traffic court.76 However, the obstruction of justice charge was 
subsequently dismissed.77 Burrell then filed suit against numerous 
defendants seeking $10,000,000 in damages for numerous alleged 
violations of his rights, including his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.78 The district court dismissed that claim 
after finding that the Fifth Amendment had not been violated.79 
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by stating that Chavez 
“precludes a section 1983 suit in the circumstances of this case, 
regardless of whether the Fifth Amendment would bar admission in 
court of insurance information produced under compulsion.”80 The 
court noted that nothing in the record indicated that the prosecution had 
sought to introduce evidence of Burrell’s failure to respond into the 
trial and that Burrell’s counsel affirmed in oral argument that Burrell 
“only claims that his constitutional rights were violated at the time the 
summonses were issued, not at the time of trial.”81 Thus, the court held 
that “Burrell’s Fifth Amendment section 1983 claim fail[ed] to state a 
claim” because he did “not allege any trial action that violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights.”82 In addition, the court stated that “[e]ven if a 
refusal to provide insurance information in a criminal case is protected 
by the Fifth Amendment (a question we do not reach), Burrell’s refusal 
outside the context of a criminal trial was not an exercise of his ‘core 
Fifth Amendment right.’”83 
73 395 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 2005). 
74 Id. at 510. 
75 Id. 




80 Id. at 513 (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003)). 
81 Id. at 513 n.4. 
82 Id. at 514. 
83 Id. at 515 (citing Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768–69). 
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3. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit addressed the meaning of “criminal case” in
Murray v. Earle.84 In that case, a two-year-old child died from a severe 
liver injury that was caused by blunt force trauma.85 The police 
removed the other children in the home for their own safety, including 
eleven-year-old L.M.86 Shortly thereafter, the police began to suspect 
that L.M. had killed the two-year-old.87 The police then interviewed 
L.M. after giving her Miranda warnings but without getting the
approval of a magistrate as required by state law.88 During the
interview, L.M. confessed that she had dropped the child and kicked
her.89
L.M. was charged with capital murder and was convicted of
negligent homicide and injury to a child after her confession was 
introduced in the jury trial.90 The juvenile court subsequently vacated 
the conviction and ordered a new trial, and L.M. was convicted of 
injury to a child after her confession was admitted in the second trial.91 
Three years later, the state appellate court reversed the conviction after 
ruling that the confession was inadmissible because the police had not 
taken L.M. to a magistrate before interviewing her.92 
After her conviction was reversed on appeal, L.M. brought suit 
against multiple individuals, alleging that they had violated a number 
of her constitutional rights.93 The district court dismissed all the 
complaints on summary judgment except for the alleged violation of 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and state law civil 
conspiracy.94 
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by stating that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies in juvenile 
court proceedings, and the court noted that even greater care should be 
taken to protect juveniles against compelled confessions.95 In addition, 
84 405 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2005). 
85 Id. at 283. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 283–84. 






95 Id. at 285 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31, 55 (1967)). 
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the court stated that “[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is a fundamental trial right which can be violated only at 
trial, even though pre-trial conduct by law enforcement officials may 
ultimately impair that right.”96 The court noted that L.M.’s case was 
distinguishable from Chavez because her compelled confession was 
actually used at trial.97 However, the court ultimately held that the 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the decision of 
the state judge who presided over the trials to admit the confession into 
evidence constituted a superseding cause of injury to L.M.98 
4. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit addressed the meaning of “criminal case” in Smith
v. Patterson.99 That case began with the arrest of Plummer and three
other teenagers for a gang-related murder.100 The police interviewed
Plummer two different times within a period of several hours, and
Plummer eventually stated that he had fired the shot that killed the
victim.101 Charges were filed against Plummer and a second teenager,
but the charges were dismissed two weeks later when gunshot residue
tests were inconclusive.102 All four teenagers filed separate lawsuits
against the police after two other individuals were convicted of the
murder.103 One of Plummer’s allegations was that a detective violated
his due process rights by forcing him to make a false confession.104
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by stating that these sorts of 
claims often involve the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.105 However, the court cited Chavez for the proposition 
that “when the government does not try to admit the confession at a 
criminal trial, the Fifth Amendment plays no role.”106 Plummer could 
not base a claim on a violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination because his statement was not introduced against him at 
trial. Instead, he had to argue that the detective’s conduct violated his 
96 Id. (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003)). 
97 Id. at 285 n.11. 
98 Id. at 293. 
99 430 F. App’x 438 (6th Cir. 2011). 
100 Id. at 439. 
101 Id. at 439–40. 
102 Id. at 440. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 441. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772–73, 778–79 (2003)). 
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Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by using interview 
techniques that “shocked the conscience.”107 The court held that the 
detective’s techniques did not rise to that level.108 
5. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit briefly addressed the meaning of “criminal case”
in Winslow v. Smith.109 In that case, the four plaintiffs had pleaded 
guilty or no contest to various charges related to the murder of a 
Nebraska woman.110 Approximately nineteen years later, DNA testing 
revealed that blood and semen collected from the scene matched 
someone wholly unconnected to the plaintiffs.111 As a result, the 
Nebraska Pardons Board granted full pardons to the four plaintiffs.112 
After their pardons, the plaintiffs filed a § 1983 suit against various 
individuals involved in the investigation and prosecution of the 
murder.113 The suit alleged that the defendants had violated the 
plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by recklessly 
investigating the case and by coercing the plaintiffs to plead guilty.114 
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the claims based on qualified and absolute 
immunity.115 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by failing 
to grant all reasonable inferences to the plaintiffs and that it should have 
allowed some claims to go forward.116 However, the Eighth Circuit 
stated that, as to a claim that the right against self-incrimination was 
violated, “[s]uch a claim fails . . . because Plaintiffs did not proceed to 
a criminal trial.”117 As support for this conclusion, the court cited 
Chavez for the proposition that “[s]tatements compelled by police 
interrogations of course may not be used against a defendant at trial, 
but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause occurs.”118 
107 Id. at 441–42. 
108 Id. at 442. 
109 696 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2012). 
110 Id. at 730. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 




117 Id. at 731 n.4. 
118 Id. (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003)). 
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B. Self-Incrimination Applies Outside of Trial
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit addressed the meaning of “criminal case” in
Higazy v. Templeton.119 In that case, Higazy was staying in a hotel 
across the street from the World Trade Center when it was destroyed 
by terrorists on September 11, 2001.120 Higazy and the other guests 
were evacuated, and the hotel employees subsequently performed an 
inventory of guest property.121 One of the employees found a radio and 
other items of Higazy’s that he considered to be “sinister,” so he 
contacted the FBI.122 Higazy was interviewed by the FBI, and he 
denied owning the radio.123 
Based on the interview, the FBI arrested Higazy and detained him 
as a material witness.124 Higazy was brought before a magistrate the 
next day on the material witness warrant.125 The magistrate denied bail 
and ruled that Higazy would be detained for at least ten more days.126 
Higazy’s attorney told the court that Higazy wanted to take a polygraph 
test to prove his innocence, and a test was scheduled.127 
Nine days later, Templeton, an FBI agent, conducted a polygraph 
examination of Higazy.128 During the test, Higazy asked to stop 
because he was experiencing pain, but Templeton called him a 
“baby” and continued the test.129 Higazy ended up providing a 
number of contradictory and incriminating statements that Templeton 
did not contest were given under coercion.130 The statements were used 
in a bail hearing the next day, and the magistrate ordered Higazy to 
remain in detention.131 Shortly thereafter, the FBI filed a criminal 
complaint against Higazy for making false statements, and the 
magistrate ordered Higazy to be detained without bail.132 However, the 
119 505 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2007). 
120 Id. at 164. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 164–65. 
124 Id. at 165. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 166. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 166–67. 
132 Id. at 167. 
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government withdrew its complaint several days later after discovering 
that someone else had owned the radio and brought it to the hotel.133 
Higazy subsequently filed suit against Templeton for violating a 
number of his constitutional rights, but the district court dismissed the 
claims after finding that Templeton had qualified immunity and that 
some of the claims were not actionable.134 
The Second Circuit began its analysis by stating that, under Chavez, 
“the privilege [against self-incrimination] may be invoked in any 
proceeding, [but] a violation of the constitutional right ‘occurs only if 
one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal 
case.’”135 The court also noted that Chavez does not address when a 
“criminal case” commences.136 The court then held that Higazy’s Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when his 
coerced statements were used against him in the bail hearing that 
occurred after the criminal complaint had been filed.137 Specifically, 
the court held that “[t]he status of bail hearings under other 
constitutional provisions supports the conclusion that such a hearing is 
part of a criminal case against an individual against whom charges are 
pending.”138 Thus, the court concluded that the district court erred 
when it dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim relating to the use of 
coerced statements at the bail hearing that occurred after the criminal 
complaint was filed.139 
2. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit addressed the meaning of “criminal case” in
Best v. City of Portland.140 Best had been charged in state court with 
various drug-related crimes based on evidence found during the search 
of two homes.141 Best moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the 
searches violated the Fourth Amendment.142 The trial court denied the 
motion, and Best appealed.143 The state appellate court upheld the trial 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 168. 
135 Id. at 171 (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003)). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 171–73. 
138 Id. at 172. 
139 Id. at 179. 
140 554 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2009). 
141 Id. at 699. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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court, but the prosecutor dropped the charges against Best before 
trial.144 
Best sued the police officers involved and stated various claims.145 
For instance, Best alleged that “his Fifth Amendment rights were 
violated because statements elicited from him in violation of Miranda 
v. Arizona were used against him at the suppression hearing, which led
to his continued confinement awaiting trial.”146 The district court
dismissed the claim because the case was dismissed before it went to
trial.147
The Seventh Circuit rejected what it called “the narrow view that 
use [of coerced statements] in a ‘criminal case’ means ‘at trial.’”148 
Instead, the court held that because “Best alleges that statements he 
made were used [at a suppression hearing] in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment long after charges were initiated against him . . . that is 
enough to allege that the statements were used in a ‘criminal case’ in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.”149 Thus, the court held that the 
claim should not have been dismissed solely on the grounds that there 
had been no trial.150 
3. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit addressed the meaning of “criminal case” in
Stoot v. City of Everett.151 This case began when a mother told the 
police to report that her daughter had described being sexually abused 
by a fourteen-year-old named Stoot.152 A detective subsequently 
interviewed Stoot, and he confessed.153 Thereafter, charges were filed 
against Stoot based at least partially on the confession.154 The trial 
court subsequently held a hearing and concluded that Stoot’s waiver of 
his Miranda rights in the interview was invalid and that his statements 
in the interview “‘were the product of impermissible coercion,’ and 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 700. 
146 Id. at 702 (citation omitted). 
147 Id. at 700. 
148 Id. at 702 (citing Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1026–27 (7th Cir. 
2006)). 
149 Id. at 702–03. 
150 Id. at 703. 
151 582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009). 
152 Id. at 912–13. 
153 Id. at 915–16. 
154 Id. at 912. 
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were therefore inadmissible.”155 The charges were eventually 
dismissed before trial.156 
After the charges were dismissed, Stoot and his parents filed suit 
against the detective and the city pursuant to § 1983.157 The district 
court dismissed the complaints and specifically found that “the Stoots 
‘failed to make out a cognizable § 1983 claim for violation of [Stoot’s] 
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination’ 
because [Stoot]’s statements were never used against him in a criminal 
trial.”158  
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by stating that “Chavez poses 
but does not decide the issue we face, as the Court had no occasion to 
explicate the sort of ‘use’ in a ‘criminal case’ that gives rise to a Fifth 
Amendment violation.”159 The court distinguished Stoot’s case from 
Chavez by stating,  
[Stoot]’s statements were used against him in (1) the Affidavit filed 
in support of the Information charging him with child molestation; 
(2) a pretrial arraignment and bail hearing; and (3) a pretrial
evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of his confession.
The question is whether these forms of reliance on [Stoot]’s
statements constitute “use” in a “criminal case” under Chavez. We
conclude that (1) and (2) above do constitute such “use.”160
After examining the circuit split, the Ninth Circuit adopted the rule that 
“[a] coerced statement has been ‘used’ in a criminal case when it has 
been relied upon to file formal charges against the declarant, to 
determine judicially that the prosecution may proceed, and to 
determine pretrial custody status.”161 According to the court, this is 
because “[s]uch uses impose precisely the burden precluded by the 
Fifth Amendment: namely, they make the declarant a witness against 
himself in a criminal proceeding.”162 
155 Id. at 916–17. 
156 Id. at 917. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 923. 
160 Id. at 923–24 (citations omitted). 
161 Id. at 925. 
162 Id. 
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4. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit addressed the meaning of “criminal case” in Vogt
v. City of Hays.163 Vogt, who was employed as a police officer for the
City of Hays, had applied for a position in the police department of
another city.164 As part of the hiring process, Vogt disclosed that he
had retained possession of a knife he received as a Hays police
officer.165 The hiring city then told Vogt that it could hire him only if
he reported the knife and returned the knife to Hays.166 Vogt returned
the knife, and the Hays police chief ordered him to submit a written
report about keeping the knife.167 This led to an internal investigation
that required Vogt to give a more detailed statement in order to keep
his job with the Hays department.168
This activity led to a larger investigation that resulted in Vogt being 
charged with two felony crimes in state court.169 However, the charges 
were dismissed after the judge determined that probable cause was 
lacking.170 Vogt then filed suit, alleging that his right against self-
incrimination was violated when his statements were used “(1) to start 
an investigation leading to the discovery of additional evidence 
concerning the knife, (2) to initiate a criminal investigation, (3) to bring 
criminal charges, and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable 
cause hearing.”171 The district court dismissed all the claims based on 
its reasoning that “the right against self-incrimination is only a trial 
right and Mr. Vogt’s statements were used in pretrial proceedings, but 
not in a trial.”172 
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by stating that the Supreme 
Court had failed to conclusively define the meaning of “criminal case,” 
and this had led to the circuit split.173 The Tenth Circuit then looked at 
the text of the Fifth Amendment and concluded that “the term ‘criminal 
case’ is broader than the term ‘criminal prosecution,’” and “on its face, 
the term ‘criminal case’ appears to encompass all of the proceedings 
163 844 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2017). 








172 Id. at 1237. 
173 Id. at 1239–40. 
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involved in a ‘criminal prosecution.’”174 The court then referred to the 
dictionary definition that existed at the time of the Founders. At that 
time, “case” meant “[a] cause or suit in court.”175 Thus, “the term 
‘case’ suggests that the Fifth Amendment encompasses more than 
the trial itself.”176 Based on this reasoning, the court held “Mr. Vogt 
alleged that his compelled statements had been used in a probable cause 
hearing. As a result, we conclude that Mr. Vogt has adequately pleaded 
a Fifth Amendment violation consisting of the use of his statements in 
a criminal case.”177 The court did, however, decline to “decide whether 
uses before the probable cause hearing would have constituted 
additional violations of the Fifth Amendment.”178 
IV 
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IS A TRIAL RIGHT 
The failure of the Supreme Court in Chavez to specifically define 
the term “criminal case” has led to a confused mixture of rules that vary 
depending upon the circuit in which a trial occurs. Different outcomes 
for identical facts based merely on the location of the court is the very 
definition of unfairness. This situation is untenable in a modern age 
when crimes and investigations frequently cross jurisdictional 
boundaries. The time has come for the Supreme Court to expressly state 
that the right against self-incrimination is not violated unless compelled 
statements are introduced at trial. This is the rule that is most consistent 
with the Court’s other cases, the language of the Fifth Amendment, and 
general policy considerations based on practicality. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Precedent for Self-Incrimination
In order to understand the Court’s opinion in Chavez, it is helpful 
to examine the way the Court has handled the right against self-
incrimination in other cases. Current Supreme Court precedence 
supports a narrow interpretation of the term “criminal case.” 
For example, the Supreme Court had previously addressed its 
understanding of Fifth Amendment rights in United States v. Verdugo-
174 Id. at 1242. 
175 Id. at 1243 (alteration in original) (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, Case, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828)). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 1246. 
178 Id. at 1247 n.8. 
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Urquidez.179 In analyzing the application of Fourth Amendment 
protections to nonresident aliens in foreign countries, the Court 
emphasized the significant operational differences between the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, stating that “[t]he privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental 
trial right of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law 
enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a 
constitutional violation occurs only at trial.”180 In contrast, the Fourth 
Amendment does not turn on the use of evidence during criminal 
proceedings but rather is “‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an 
unreasonable government intrusion.”181 Although the case turned on 
the Fourth Amendment, the language in Verdugo-Urquidez clearly 
suggests that pretrial conduct of law enforcement officials does not 
violate the right against self-incrimination. 
The Court also made statements in the earlier case of Withrow v. 
Williams182 that support a narrow interpretation of “criminal case.” 
When examining the federal habeas claims of a state inmate, the Court 
specifically described the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination as a “trial right.”183 In addition, the Court stated that the 
right cannot be “necessarily divorced from the correct ascertainment of 
guilt.”184 This “suggests that the right is much more closely tied to the 
trial than to any other proceeding.”185 Indeed, if the right is tied to the 
ascertainment of guilt, pretrial proceedings are not included in the Fifth 
Amendment’s definition of “criminal case” because they focus on 
things other than ascertaining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition to these pre-Chavez opinions, the Supreme Court also 
commented on the right against self-incrimination shortly after Chavez 
in United States v. Patane.186 In that plurality opinion, the Court held 
that because the Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated by 
introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as result of voluntary 
statements, failure to give a suspect Miranda warnings does not require 
179 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
180 Id. at 264 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
181 Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). 
182 507 U.S. 680 (1993). 
183 Id. at 692. 
184 Id. 
185 Michael Votel, What Is a “Criminal Case” Within the Meaning of the Self-
Incrimination Clause? So Far, the Supreme Court Has Pleaded the Fifth, 46 N. KY. L. REV. 
87, 102 (2019). 
186 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
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suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but 
voluntary statements.187 Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist 
and Scalia, stated that in regard to the Self-Incrimination Clause, “We 
need not decide here the precise boundaries of the Clause’s protection. 
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the core protection 
afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause is a prohibition on 
compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial.”188 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred in the 
judgment and stated that it was “unnecessary to decide whether the 
detective’s failure to give Patane the full Miranda warnings should be 
characterized as a violation of the Miranda rule itself, or whether there 
is ‘[any]thing to deter’ so long as the unwarned statements are not later 
introduced at trial.”189 
How does Mitchell v. United States190 fit in? Does the Court’s 
conclusion that a sentencing hearing is part of a “criminal case”191 
mean that a “criminal case” also includes pretrial proceedings? It does 
not. The issue in Mitchell was not whether the government could 
introduce a prior compelled statement of the defendant in her 
sentencing hearing, it was whether the court could compel a defendant 
to provide testimony in a sentencing hearing and make an adverse 
inference against her if she didn’t testify.192 Thus, the Court was 
addressing when the privilege could be invoked, and its decision was 
perfectly consistent with its prior rulings that the privilege can be 
invoked essentially anytime that immunity is not granted.193 In 
addition, a sentencing hearing is obviously not a pretrial proceeding. 
Sentencing can occur only after there has been a conviction in trial or 
by guilty plea. As noted by the Court in Mitchell, “a court must impose 
sentence before a judgment of conviction can issue.”194 For all intents 
and purposes under this rule, a sentencing hearing is just another part 
of a trial proceeding.  
187 Id. at 637–38. 
188 Id. at 637 (emphasis added) (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764–68, 777–
79 (2003)). 
189 Id. at 645 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
190 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 
191 Id. at 327. 
192 See id. at 318–19. 
193 See supra notes 14–23 and accompanying text. 
194 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 327 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1)). 
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B. Text of the Fifth Amendment
Any interpretation of “criminal case” must also include an 
examination of the text of the Fifth Amendment itself. The Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”195 While this simple language should be easy to 
interpret, it is not. In fact, it has been called “an unsolved riddle of vast 
proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights” that 
“[f]rom the beginning . . . lacked an easily identifiable rationale.”196 
The natural tendency might be to focus only on the phrase “criminal 
case,” but it must be examined in context with the term “witness.” As 
stated by Professor Akhil Reed Amar, “witness” in its natural sense 
means “someone whose testimony, or utterances, are introduced at 
trial. Witnesses are those who take the stand and testify, or whose out-
of-court depositions or affidavits are introduced at trial in front of the 
jury.”197 Indeed, Chavez recognized this when stating that “[a]lthough 
conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately 
impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial” and 
that “Martinez was never made to be a ‘witness’ against himself in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because 
his statements were never admitted as testimony against him.”198 
When determining what the term “witness” means, referring to the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is also helpful. This 
clause states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”199 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently stated that the right of 
confrontation is a right that applies at trial.200 Indeed, there is extensive 
195 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
196 Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995). 
197 Id. at 900. 
198 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003). 
199 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
200 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10 (1987) (“[T]he right to 
confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of 
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination,” and does not “require 
the government to produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial.”); California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (“[I]t is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the 
time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.”); 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial 
right.”), overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see 
also Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 657 (2011) (“As a rule, if an out-of-court 
statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless 
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case law in the lower courts declining to apply the confrontation right 
to various pretrial proceedings.201 Because the term “witness” in the 
Confrontation Clause means a witness at trial, it follows that the term 
“witness” means the same thing in the Self-Incrimination Clause.202 
Because interpreting the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause is 
difficult, examining the original understanding and purpose of the 
clause is helpful.203 Indeed, “[m]any of the great legal minds of the 
early-to-mid twentieth century favored the purpose-oriented approach” 
to constitutional and statutory interpretation.204 The followers of this 
approach, such as Justice Holmes, Justice Cardozo, and Judge Hand, 
“believed that a court’s job was to give effect to the ‘will’ of the 
legislature, irrespective of whether that will was found in the ‘terms’ of 
the statute itself.”205 
In the American colonies, “the privilege was a trial right [that] did 
not affect pretrial questioning, which was not conducted under 
oath.”206 This was because the privilege was, in part, designed to 
protect people from being forced to either tell the truth and incriminate 
the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior 
opportunity to confront that witness.”) (emphasis added). 
201 See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 836 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he sixth 
amendment does not provide a confrontation right at a preliminary hearing.”); United States 
v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 1972) (“There is no Sixth Amendment requirement
that [defendants] be allowed to confront [witnesses] at a preliminary hearing prior to trial.”);
Peterson v. California, 604 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Crawford does not disturb the holdings of Andrus and Harris because
Crawford deals only with the admission of testimonial hearsay evidence at trial); see
also United States v. Hernandez, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1227 (D.N.M. 2011) (right to
confrontation does not apply at detention hearings); United States v. Bibbs, 488 F. Supp. 2d
925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (right to confrontation does not apply at detention hearings);
United States ex rel. Smith v. Pate, 305 F. Supp. 225, 227 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (right to
confrontation does not apply at suppression hearings (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 312–13 (1967))).
202 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 196, at 919 (“Only the defendant’s compelled 
testimony should be protected by the [Fifth] Amendment. The ‘witnessing’ that the 
defendant has a right to exclude from the criminal trial includes both communicating on the 
stand at trial and introducing at trial any earlier compelled depositions. This definition of 
witness closely tracks what seems to be the best definition of witness under the 
Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.”). 
203 Votel, supra note 185, at 99 (“Because the plain language of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause is, on its own, inconclusive on the precise moment that a ‘criminal case’ commences, 
it is helpful to look to the original understanding and fundamental purpose of the Clause.”). 
204 Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A Practitioner’s Guide 
to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REV. 451, 456 (2002). 
205 Id. at 456–57 (citations omitted). 
206 William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 
393, 416 (1995). 
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themselves or lie under oath.207 Indeed, “the privilege was very much 
considered a trial right and quite often did not stop English and colonial 
governments from using a person’s self-incriminating statements at 
trial” and “[t]here is a strong argument that this weak colonial privilege 
against self-incrimination is one of the reasons why the drafters chose 
to include the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Bill of Rights.”208 
Even after it was enacted, “the Fifth Amendment rarely played a 
significant role in criminal procedure and the privilege against self-
incrimination was still strictly limited to trials.”209 This was largely 
because defense lawyers were not yet common, so a criminal defendant 
would be forced to speak to defend himself, which meant that exercise 
of the privilege was not entirely plausible.210  
The Founders would have known that the right against self-
incrimination was limited to trials. The fact that the Founders did not 
clearly state in the Fifth Amendment that the right applied to pretrial 
proceedings indicates that this was not their purpose. Rather, it would 
appear that their purpose was to enact “a protection against torture, 
which might often lead to unreliable confessions.”211 Thus, “[w]hile 
the early history and understanding of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
cannot simply be applied one-for-one today, it at least suggests that the 
privilege against self-incrimination was originally designed to be quite 
narrow.”212 
C. Policy and Practicality
Extending the definition of “criminal case” to include pretrial 
proceedings would fundamentally change the nature of those 
proceedings. It would do so in a way that is simply not practical. 
Pretrial proceedings are simply not set up to deal with the fact-
intensive inquiry that is required to determine whether a statement was 
“compelled.” As stated by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, a determination of whether a statement was voluntary 
requires an assessment of “the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details 
207 Id. at 412–13. 
208 Votel, supra note 185, at 100. 
209 Id. 
210 Stuntz, supra note 206, at 419–20. 
211 Amar & Lettow, supra note 196, at 865. 
212 Votel, supra note 185, at 100. 
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of the interrogation.”213 Some of the factors that must be assessed 
under the totality of the circumstances include 
the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low 
intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional 
rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of 
the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the 
deprivation of food or sleep.214  
Essentially, a court must assess “the factual circumstances surrounding 
the confession, assess[] the psychological impact on the accused, and 
evaluate[] the legal significance of how the accused reacted.”215 
Pretrial proceedings, such as bail hearings and probable cause 
determinations, are not set up for this fact-intensive “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis. In addition, these assessments frequently 
require significant legal research to complete the analysis. A “totality 
of the circumstances” analysis often requires a lengthy suppression 
hearing and extensive legal briefing for a court to determine whether a 
statement was voluntary and will be admissible at trial.216 Requiring 
this to be done in pretrial proceedings would significantly expand the 
time that these sorts of hearings take and would slow down the justice 
system, greatly harming judicial economy.217  
In addition, a rule that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not apply 
in pretrial proceedings “fits with the way we apply rules of evidence, 
such as hearsay.”218 This is because the “[r]ules of evidence, of course, 
apply at trial—but they do not apply in pretrial proceedings, such as 
depositions and grand jury hearings.”219 As stated by Professor Amar, 
Like the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, rules of 
evidence such as hearsay are meant to improve reliability. Reliability 
of individual bits of information is critical at trial, where final 
decisions are made, but not so critical where the goal is simply to 
gather as much relevant information as possible before sifting, as in 
pretrial proceedings. The different burdens of proof at the pretrial and 
trial stages—probable cause for an indictment as opposed to proof 
213 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
214 Id. (citations omitted). 
215 Id. 
216 See id. 
217 See, e.g., Samantha Ruben, Note, Clarifying the Scope of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause: City of Hays v. Vogt, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 137, 148–49 (2019) (“Before resolving 
preliminary issues in a case, courts would have to adjudicate fact-intensive suppression 
questions. . . . It might also slow down the pretrial process, including probable cause 
assessments and bail determinations.”). 
218 Amar & Lettow, supra note 196, at 910 n.229. 
219 Id. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt for a criminal conviction—lead to 
differences in the need for rules emphasizing reliability.220 
Essentially, the very different nature of pretrial proceedings as to the 
rules of evidence and the burden of proof shows that the benefits of 
including these hearings in the definition of “criminal case” are not 
worth the cost. 
Expanding the definition of “criminal case” to include pretrial 
proceedings would also have an unwarranted deterrent effect on police 
investigations. The Supreme Court has stated that “[j]ust as the law 
does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, 
it cannot realistically require that police[men] investigating serious 
crimes make no errors whatsoever.”221 Subjecting the police to liability 
for improper interviews that are never used in trial would penalize them 
for the sort of mistakes the Supreme Court said are allowable in our 
system of justice, and it would deter police from conducting as many 
interviews as they otherwise would. Indeed, 
Reading pretrial, pre-indictment violations into existing Self-
Incrimination Clause doctrine needlessly blurs the line between 
constitutional and procedural rights under the Fifth Amendment. . . . 
Adopting a rule to allow for self-incrimination liability in most 
pretrial proceedings absent a full balancing of competing interests 
may also adversely affect future prosecutions. Restraining 
prosecutorial conduct could have an overdeterrent effect . . . .222 
This sort of deterrence is unnecessary “because substantive and 
procedural safeguards already exist to protect the purpose of the 
privilege.”223 First, a compelled statement of a defendant will be 
suppressed and will not be admitted in the trial.224 Second, as noted by 
the Court in Chavez, plaintiffs can already sue the police for torture or 
other abuse that leads to a compelled confession. Instead, this reading 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause’s scope “simply means that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Fifth 
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry 
in those cases and provide relief in appropriate circumstances.”225 
“Ultimately, because there are other substantive and procedural 
220 Id. 
221 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974). 
222 Geoffrey B. Fehling, Note, Verdugo, Where’d You Go? Stoot v. City of Everett and 
Evaluating Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Civil Liability Violations, 18 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 481, 519–20 (2011).
223 Votel, supra note 185, at 103.
224 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
225 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003).
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safeguards already in place to prevent and discourage the compelling 
of statements, thereby helping to prevent violations of the Self-
Incrimination Clause from ever occurring, the broader view of the 
Clause is both wrong and unnecessary.”226 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the Supreme Court in Chavez to specifically define 
the term “criminal case” has led to a confused mixture of rules that vary 
depending upon the circuit in which the trial occurs. Different 
outcomes for identical facts based merely on the location of the court 
is the very definition of unfairness. This situation is untenable in a 
modern age when the investigation of crime frequently crosses 
jurisdictional boundaries. Regardless of what has been done in the past, 
the time has come for the Supreme Court to expressly state that the 
right against self-incrimination is not violated unless compelled 
statements are introduced at trial. As noted by Professor Amar, 
[T]he question is not whether the word case must mean “at trial but
not before” but whether it most sensibly should mean this to achieve
maximum textual coherence, structural harmony, common sense, and
so on. Our reading of the word case [(to mean at trial)] enables the
words of the Self-Incrimination Clause to fit together and make good
policy sense; it coheres with the idea of “witness” “in” a “case”; it
fits with the cognate words and principle of the Sixth Amendment,
which is about “witnesses” at trial (there is no right to confront grand
jury witnesses or those who give investigators pretrial statements that
are never introduced at trial) . . . and it draws support from American
history.227
Abraham Lincoln famously stated that in regard to the participants 
in great contests, “[b]oth may be, and one must be, wrong.”228 The 
same principle applies to the circuit courts when it comes to the 
definition of “criminal case” for the Self-Incrimination Clause. They 
cannot all be right, and this system of rules based on the location of the 
court is not fair to litigants or the public. It is time for this unfairness to 
end. 
226 Votel, supra note 185, at 104. 
227 Amar & Lettow, supra note 196, at 910 n.229. 
228 Abraham Lincoln, Meditation on the Divine Will (Sept. 1862), in 5 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 403, 403–04 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
